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Abstract 
 
This paper extends the use of Altman’s Z-Score bankruptcy predictor to the textile industry. Gen-
erally, firms benefited from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) but suffered fi-
nancially after the Asian currency crisis. The study finds that Type I classification errors support 
prior research while Type II classification errors are much higher than previous literature find-
ings. The results indicate a need for a modified bankruptcy predictor for the textile industry. 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
he purpose of this paper is to examine the use of a multiple discriminant analysis (MDA) model, the Alt-
man’s Z-Score (Altman, 1968), in predicting bankruptcy in the textile industry. Although much research ex-
ists on the application and the success of the Altman’s Z-Score, there is no known study related to this in-
dustry. The United States textile industry, although facing its worst crisis since the Great Depression, continues to 
represent one of the largest manufacturing segments in the United States and the leader of textile technological ad-
vancements in the world (American Textile Manufacturers Institute, 2002). Therefore, we find it important to ex-
amine the financial health of the industry and major textile firms for industry specific improvements to bankruptcy 
and financial distress prediction. 
 
 The results of our study found that the average Z-Score for major textile firms improved (increase) after 
NAFTA was passed but decreased after the Asian currency crisis in June 1997. In fact, the average Z-Scores for 
2000 and 2001 fall in the distressed range. A review of a sample of only bankrupt textile firms supports a high pre-
diction accuracy of the Z-Scores two years prior to bankruptcy filing or a low prediction of nonbankrupt when the 
firm is actually bankrupt (Type I error). In another sample which included nonbankrupt firms, the prediction of firm 
bankruptcy when the firm is not bankrupt (Type II error) was significantly higher than Altman’s research (Altman, 
1993), which is supportive of more recent research (Altman, 2002). 
 
 This study contributes to current bankruptcy literature in several ways. First, it uses established publicly-
traded textile firms with greater market impact than samples of small firms as used in previous studies. Second, the 
study samples the major firms in the apparel, floor coverings, home furnishings and the automotive/industrial com-
ponents of the textile industry. This includes not only bankrupt firms but also nonbankrupt firms. Third, it focuses 
on an industry that is reported as distressed but to the contrary has currently more nonbankrupt companies than 
bankrupt ones. Finally, the study supports the original application of the Z-Score for bankruptcy prediction of manu-
facturers. 
 
 The next section provides a brief literature review. The third section describes the sample and methodolo-
gy. The forth section discusses the research findings. The final section presents our conclusions and opportunities 
for future research.  
 
 
____________________ 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
T 
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2.0  Literature Review 
 
 In landmark research by Beaver (1966), individual financial ratios were analyzed to determine the best ratio 
for predicting failure of a firm. In response to this research, Altman (1968) developed the Z-Score, a MDA) of fi-
nancial ratios of a firm, as a predictor of bankruptcy. After calculating 22 ratios for a sample of bankrupt and healthy 
manufacturing firms, the following weighted combination of five ratios performed the best in the prediction of cor-
porate bankruptcy: 
 
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + .6X4 + 1.0X5 
 
With 
 
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets 
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets 
X3 = Earnings Before Interest and Taxes/Total Assets 
X4 = Market Value Equity/Book Value of Total Debt 
X5 = Sales/Total Assets 
 
 The greater the possibility of bankruptcy, the lower a firm’s Z-Score. Altman (1968) found that a Z-Score 
over 2.67 predicted a healthy firm whereas a Z-Score below 1.81 predicted bankruptcy. Z-Scores between 1.81 and 
2.67 indicate potential bankruptcy or a grey area. The predictability of Altman’s Z-Score was over 80 percent cor-
rect for two years prior to bankruptcy but less than half of that for earlier years. 
 
 Later research builds upon the MDA to test and offer predictability improvements to the Altman’s Z-Score.  
Deakin (1972) developed a model which was later modified (Nunthaphad, 2000) that included all the ratios identi-
fied by Beaver as useful predictors of bankruptcy increasing the bankruptcy predictability to three years. The re-
search is limited by the small sample and the requirement that a specific model needs to be built for each year prior 
to failure.  Edmister (1972) used the financial ratios studied in both the Altman and Beaver research and developed a 
seven-variable discriminant function model for small firms. Although Edmister uses tri-annual samples, the results 
support Altman’s findings. Blum (1974) developed a “failing company model” based on expected cash flows of 
large firms for use in the Justice Department. The results were accurate for five years prior to bankruptcy but require 
a matched validation sample to compare to the test sample. Altman modified his original study. In 1983, Altman 
substituted the firm’s book value of equity for the market value in X4 (Altman, 1983). This resulted in a new Z-
Score formula where Z = .717X1 + .847X2 + 3.107X3 + .42X4 + .998X5 and the gray area is 1.23 to 2.90. Finally 
in 1993, Altman adjusted the model for nonmanufacturing firms by eliminating the X5 (Sales to Total Assets) varia-
ble (Altman, 1993). After a complete reestimation of the model, the revised four-variable model resulted in the fol-
lowing formula: Z = 6.567X1 + 3.26X2 + 6.72X3 + 1.05X4. The cutoff for bankruptcy dropped to 1.10 and the gray 
area became wider to a range of 1.10 to 2.60. The revised Z-Score is considered only slightly less accurate in terms 
of Type 1 errors (91% accuracy rate versus previous 94%, Altman, 1993). 
 
 There are bankruptcy prediction studies other than the MDA models mentioned previously. Although beyond 
the scope of this paper, a brief mention is needed. Altman et al. (1977) modified the Z-Score by making accounting 
adjustments to the data and developing a new seven-variable model known as the ZETA model. This model im-
proved the prior bankruptcy prediction accuracy from two years to five years prior to failure. The ZETA model 
ranks first in accuracy of bankruptcy studies but is a proprietary product only available through ZETA Services, Inc. 
(Altman, 1993). Other research includes logit and probit analysis or multivariate conditional probability in studies 
by Ohlson (1980), Zavgren (1985) and Platt and Platt (1990). This research estimates the coefficients that cause pat-
terns in firm and industry bankruptcy data. Although predictive, the patterns must be updated over time resulting in 
a more complicated model for practitioners to utilize. A more promising area of research is artificial neural networks 
(ANN). ANN mimic human brain reasoning by training the processing elements to discover patterns and relation-
ships in data (Haykin, 1999).  Coats and Fant (1993) and Luther (1998) demonstrate ANN analysis as effective or 
superior to MDA and logit analysis, respectively. A limitation to ANN is the reliance on the knowledge of experts, 
who can make varying degrees of Type I and II errors (Altman & McGough, 1974), to uncover recurring patterns 
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and conclusions in bankruptcy prediction decisions. Altman et al. (1994) found problems with the weighting of the 
indicators but recommended an integrated approach of ANN and MDA for predictive reinforcement. 
 
 Due to the popularity, simplicity and accuracy of the Altman’s Z-Score, we selected it to predict bankruptcy 
in the textile industry. As noted previously, research exists for large manufacturing firms, small firms, and private 
firms. Also, research has focused on MDA both internationally, in countries such as Australia, Brazil, France and 
others, (Altman, 1993), and in various US industries such as steel (Altman, 1993), savings & loans (Pantalone & 
Platt, 1987), railroads (Altman, 1983), and retail sales (Nunthaphad, 2000).  
 
 Past research on textile firm bankruptcy is limited but thought potentially useful. Altman et al. (1974) re-
searched the credit worthiness of loans to cotton and wool textile firms in France, but the results found higher Type I 
and II errors. Current research is needed. First, it is needed because all bankruptcy is an inefficient use of market and 
entity resources (Altman, 1984). Second, the threat of bankruptcy in the textile industry may be higher due to the in-
creased debt from expansion into cheaper labor markets, such as Mexico, and technology investments (Burritt, 
2000) and the threat from low-priced textile and apparel products of Asian goods (American Textile Manufacturers 
Institute, August 2001, p. 7). Finally, although the Asian market has helped keep the cost down for consumers in the 
short run, a smaller domestic textile industry may lead to serious market problems. For example, buyers relying on 
Asian suppliers and just-in-time inventory practices scrambled for new local suppliers after the September 11 terror-
ist attacks (Malone, 2001). Therefore, an industry relative approach to the Altman’s Z-Score may provide increased 
accuracy in bankruptcy prediction and assist in financial turnaround for the textile industry. 
 
3.0  Sample and Methodology 
 
3.1  Sample 
 
 One sample consists of: (1) publicly-traded companies with the Standard Institute Classification (SIC) 2211, 
cotton and woven fabric business identified by Harris InfoSource  International, Inc.(Harris InfoSource International 
(SIC 2211), 2002), (2) The top five publicly-traded firms of each of the 26 SIC codes for textile related businesses 
over a five year period (Harris InfoSource International, 2002). This search identified 16 companies from SIC 2211 
and 22 companies from the SIC code major company list. Six companies were excluded for being either a foreign 
firm or having no available financial information. To analyze the impact of both NAFTA and the 1997 Asian Crisis, 
nine years of financial information was obtained through Mergent’s FISOnline database (FISOnline, 2002). For 
companies missing any financial information, SEC filings were used. Of the sample of 32 firms, seven were in 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection.  
 
 Another sample of only bankrupt textile firms was selected using BankruptcyData.com (New Generation Re-
search, 2002). Of the 32 listed firms, 15 were excluded for lack of financial information two years prior to bankrupt-
cy or for being out of bankruptcy. Financial information required to calculate the variables in the Altman’s Z-Score 
was obtained for the five years prior to bankruptcy.  
 
3.2  Methodology 
 
 Much of past research uses multiple regression analysis to study multivariate relationships (Hair et al., 1998). 
This method does not predict or explain nonmetric variables. MDA estimates the relationship between a nonmetric 
dependent variable and metric independent variables to find the group to which the dependent variable belongs.  
MDA requires establishing classification groups, collecting data (financial ratios) for objects (corporations) in the 
groups, and determining discriminant coefficients or weights. The discriminant coefficients are determined by the 
variance of variables across the original sample. In order to test the accuracy of Altman’s Z-Score in the textile in-
dustry, we use the discriminant coefficients of the original Altman (1968) Z-Score and the revised Altman’s Z-Score 
for private firms. The comparison to private firms is helpful for purchases of publicly-traded textile firms by private 
holding companies and to other existing private textile firms.  
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 There are several assumptions made in our research about the samples and MDA. We assume the variables 
are normally distributed and represent a majority of the textile population. This is supported by selecting the largest 
publicly-traded firms of all textile related SIC codes for the first sample. We also consider the second sample, al-
though a small sample, unbiased because it is selected from a list of all publicly-traded textile bankruptcies since 
1988 (New Generation Research, 2002). Other problems with the application of MDA (Eisenbeis, 1977), such as in-
terpretation of individual variables, incorrect or lack of dimension reduction, and poor definition of sampled groups 
are dealt with in the development and application of the Altman’s Z-Score over the years (Altman & Eisenbeis, 
1978; Altman, 1993). There are potential problems with the assessment of the gray zone in our research of bankrupt 
firms. Not only is the gray zone wide (Clark et al., 1997), the Z-Score user can interpret a Z-Score in this zone to fit 
their desired results. This is discussed in the next section.   
 
 The results for the average annual revised Z-Scores for 1993-2001 are in Table 1. The results show im-
provement after NAFTA, from 1994 to 1997. In 1998, the average revised Z-Score drops to the lowest level in six 
years. The Z-Scores improve slightly in 1999 but fall into the gray zone in both 2000 and 2001. This mirrors the 
trend of the textile relative stock price strength as compared to the Value Line Comparison of 98 industries (Sirois, 
2002). The invasion of less expensive Asian consumer products is diminishing the positive effects of NAFTA. 
Firms, such as Guilford Mills, incurred a lot of debt opening plants and shifting product lines to Mexico only to see 
China sell products illegally through Mexico prior to being admitted into the World Trade Organization (American 
Textile Manufacturers Institute, August, 2001). Guilford Mills filed for bankruptcy protection in 2002 and has 
closed its Mexican plants (Heisler, 2002). On average, the Altman’s revised Z-Score is accurate in prediction the 
textile industry trend. The following discussion reviews the accuracy of the samples for Type I and Type II errors.    
 
4.0  Summary of Type I & II Errors 
 
 Altman (1993, p. 204) found the following bankruptcy prediction accuracy of the revised Z-Score Model 
(Table 2): 
 
 
Table 2 
       Classified    
________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Actual      Bankrupt Nonbankrupt  Total 
Bankrupt    30  3   33 
      (90.9%)  (9.1%) 
       (Type I) 
Nonbankrupt    1  32   33 
      (3.0%)  (97.0%)  
       (Type II) 
 
 
 The results for our sample of 32 textile firms (seven bankrupt and 25 healthy) found the following results for one year 
(Table 3) and two years (Table 4) prior to bankruptcy: 
 
 
Table 3: Textile Firm Sample One Year Prior to Bankruptcy 
Error Type  Number   Percent   Percent   Sample 
    Correct   Correct   Error   Number 
Type I       32   100.00   0.00       32 
       
Type II      26   81.25   18.75       32 
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Table 4: Textile Firm Sample Two Years Prior to Bankruptcy 
 
Error Type  Number   Percent   Percent   Sample 
    Correct   Correct   Error   Number 
Type I        30   93.75   6.25       32 
 
Type II       27   84.38   15.63        32 
 
 
 
 Our assumptions about classification of Z-Scores in the gray zone favor the Altman’s Z-Score in that we treat 
Z-Scores for bankrupt firms as accurately predicting if in the gray zone or in the bankruptcy zone. On the other 
hand, we consider only the bankruptcy zone Z-Score for Type II errors. If these assumptions were reversed, the 
Type I error rates for one year and two years prior to bankruptcy are 6.25% and 21.19%, respectively. Whereas the 
Type II error rates for one year and two years prior to bankruptcy increase to 34.38% and 31.25%, respectively. The 
accuracy results support the predictive accuracy of Altman (1993) no matter the assumptions for one year and two 
years prior to bankruptcy. Before the Type II errors are discussed, the sample results of the bankrupt textile firms are 
reviewed. 
 
 A comparison of original Altman’s Z-Score model (Altman, 1968) and our sample of 19 bankrupt textile 
firms Z-Score classification accuracy is shown in Table 5.  
 
 
Table 5 Classification Accuracy of Altman and Textile Firm Z-Scores 
 
Years Prior   1968 Model  Textile Firms¹  Textile Firms² 
To Bankruptcy    Bankrupt    Bankrupt    Bankrupt 
 
1         93.9       94.7       73.7 
2         71.9       52.6       15.8 
3         48.3       42.1       21.1 
4         28.6       36.8       15.8 
5         36.0       29.4       5.9 
 
¹ Assumes that a Z-Score in bankruptcy zone and gray zone predicted bankruptcy. 
² Assumes that a Z-Score only in bankruptcy zone predicts bankruptcy. 
 
 
 From the above table, the Altman Z-Score one year prior to bankruptcy is an accurate predictor. The results 
when assuming a Z-Score in the bankruptcy zone and the gray zone predicts bankruptcy is similar to the original 
Altman (1968) results except for two years prior to bankruptcy. A closer look at textile firms classified as healthy 
two years prior to bankruptcy finds five of nine firms being healthy two years prior to the Asian currency crisis. If 
these firms were eliminated the bankruptcies correctly identified, 71.4 percent, are very close to the Altman (1968) 
results. The second Textile Firms Bankruptcy column highlights the classification of the gray zone again. The next 
section deals with the false positives (Type II errors), that is, predicted bankruptcies that did not occur. 
 
4.1  Type II Errors 
 
 As noted above, six companies under the revised Altman’s Z-Score are Type II errors one year prior to bank-
ruptcy. This percentage is 15.75% higher than the original Altman’s Z-Score results (Altman, 1968) and double the 
results of the revised Z-Score (Altman, 1993). Also, two years prior to bankruptcy, five companies are Type II er-
rors, 12.75% higher than Altman’s original research. Altman (1993) refers to this phenomenon as a “staying alive” 
event by management or creditors and finds that it has increased “as much as 25% of all firms having Z-Scores” in 
the bankruptcy zone (Altman, 2002, p. 14). The following is a brief synopsis of the cause of the Type II errors for 
each textile firm identified. 
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4.2  Collins & Aikman Corporation 
 
 Collins & Aikman Corporation (C&A) is “engaged in the design, engineering and manufacturing of automo-
tive interior components, including instrument panels, fully assembled cockpit modules, floor and acoustic systems, 
automotive fabric, interior trim and convertible top systems” (The Wall Street Journal Briefing Books, 2003). 
Through a series of strategic acquisitions, C&A has “one of the largest interior styling product portfolios in the in-
dustry” (Collins & Aikman, 2002). The C&A’s acquisition of Textron Inc.’s automotive trim unit (TAC-Trim) in 
December 2001 made C&A a global leader in the cockpit systems market and the leader in the North American in-
strument panel market (Collins & Aikman, 2002). “C&A instituted a strong restructuring plan and brought in a new 
team of highly-qualified senior executives from other automotive suppliers…Primarily as a result of these restruc-
turing efforts, C&A produces five straight quarters of revenue growth through the second quarter of 2000” (Collins 
& Aikman, 2002). In 2000, C&A moved the corporate headquarters from Charlotte, NC to Troy, Michigan to be 
closer to its customers and the entire automotive industry. Heartland Industrial Partners, L.P., a private equity firm, 
took majority shareholder status in 2001 through purchasing both newly issued stock and shares from The Black-
stone Group and Wasserstein Perella (Collins & Aikman, 2002). C&A has continued to “engage in cost-cutting 
measures that include the shutdown of three money-losing plants in Europe and the elimination of its European cor-
porate headquarters and duplicative infrastructure. The measures also include the closure of three subscale plant op-
erations in North America” (Value Line, 2002). 
 
4.3 Cone Mills Corporation 
 
 Cone Mills Corporation (Cone) was founded by the Cone brothers in 1891 in Greensboro, North Carolina. It 
is “the world’s largest producer of denim fabrics and the largest commission printer of home furnishings fabric in 
North America” (Cone Mills Corporation, 2002). Cone is one of the domestic textile companies that have been dra-
matically affected by Mexican owned textile plants. “Mexico’s yearly denim-production capacity has grown from 
about 150 million yards before NAFTA to more that 450 million yards today . . . The global oversupply had eroded 
mills’ profits by depressing the wholesale price for denim. It sells for $2.20 a yard, nearly 27 percent cheaper than 
four years ago” (Burritt, 2000, p. Q.1). Cone, although reporting losses for four of the last five years, is shutting 
down unprofitable US operations and investing more cash in a new Mexican factory.  Cone has over 4,000 em-
ployees at plants in North Carolina, South Carolina and Mexico. Cone sold its converted fabrics operation last year, 
is looking to sell the khaki business and use the proceeds to pay down debt. Cone continues to remain out of Chapter 
11 bankruptcy. 
 
4.4 Hexcel Corporation 
 
 Hexcel Corporation (Hexcel) is a Connecticut based firm with sales in the commercial aerospace, space and 
defense, electronics and industrial markets (Hexcel Corporation, 2002). It is tied to the textile industry under SIC 
code 2295 (Harris InfoSource, 2002), non-rubber coated fabrics, which includes carbon and fiberglass fabrics used 
in commercial aerospace, space and defense contracts. The firm emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 1995 by of-
fering additional stock for capital infusion and a merger with the debt ridden composites division of Ciba-Geigy Ltd. 
Hexcel only moved into the healthy Z-Score zone in 1997 at which time it doubled its debt by purchasing another 
composites products division.  Since 1997, Hexcel had slipped back into the bankruptcy zone by 2001. On Decem-
ber 31, 2001, Hexcel had total liabilities of $922 million and total assets of $789.4 million (SEC, 2002). GS Capital 
Partners, an affiliate of Goldman Sachs, previously purchased 14.5 million shares from Ciba (formerly Ciba-
Geigy)(Investor Group, 2000) and recently agreed along with two other private investment groups, to infuse $125 
million for convertible preferred stock to help pay maturing debt (Hexcel Corporation, 2002). In addition to the 
higher debt, the commercial aerospace and electronics industries have faced financial problems which increased 
Hexcel’s financial problems. We would conclude that Hexcel’s lack of bankruptcy filing is a result of a combination 
of questionable past management decisions and owners’ hopes of equity preservation to keep the company alive.      
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4.5  Lear Corporation 
 
 Lear Corporation is a Michigan based “automotive supplier to manufacturers around the world, including 
General Motors, Ford, DaimlerChrysler, BMW, Fiat, Volkswagen, Peugeot, Renault, Toyota and Subaru. The com-
pany has established in-house capabilities in all five principal segments of the automotive interior market: seat sys-
tems, flooring and acoustic systems, door panels, instrument panels and headliners. The company is also a global 
supplier of automotive electronic and electrical distribution systems” (The Wall Street Journal Briefing Books, 
2003). “Last decade, the company implemented an aggressive acquisition program to widen its footprint into areas 
such as interiors and electronics. This strategy helped land about $3.5 billion in new business for the next five years.  
However, over the past three years, Lear has stayed away from acquisitions to concentrate on paying down its debt. 
Indeed, during that time the company reduced its borrowings by over $1 billion” (Value Line, 2003). Recently Lear 
announced signing an innovative contract with General Motors Corp., under which Lear will have complete respon-
sibility for designing and engineering interiors for Buick LeSabre and Cadillac DeVille. The company will also han-
dle purchasing and delivery of the interiors and this “total interior integrator” program is expected to generate an av-
erage of $825 million in additional annual net sales (Wall Street Journal, January 27, 2003). At the same time, Lear 
reported record net sales of $14.4 billion for the full year of 2002, up 6% from 2001, along with a 9.3% increase in 
adjusted operating income and a 25% increase in adjusted earnings per share. The world’s largest automotive inte-
rior supplier said “it has a $4 billion backlog of new business coming on stream in the 2003-2007 period” and “is 
aiming to reduce its debt load from 58% of capitalization to a level in the high 40% range” (Wall Street Journal, 
January 27, 2003). 
 
4.6 Playtex Products, Inc. 
 
 Playtex Products, Inc. (Playtex) was in the bankruptcy zone when it went public in 1994 and continues in 
bankruptcy through 2001. Originally known for its personal care products and plastic gloves, Playtex incurred a 
heavy debt load to finance a takeover of the company in the late 1980s (Syre & Nutile, 1994). This debt, at $841.2 
million in 1994, through additional purchases of other product lines, has continued to remain over $850 million. Ad-
ditional cash infusion has come from a couple of investment groups which own over 50 percent of the stock. Al-
though Playtex has generated net income every year and reduced its negative stockholders’ equity, total liabilities 
have exceeded total assets every year. Although the earnings growth is expected to continue, Playtex is evaluating 
selling parts or the entire firm to pay down debt (Playtex Products, 2002).  
 
4.7 Westpoint Stevens, Inc. 
 
Westpoint Stevens is “the successor corporation to West Point-Pepperell, Inc. through a series of mergers 
occurring in December 1993.” (Westpoint, 2002)  Through its various subsidiaries and licensing arrangements, 
Westpoint Stevens has major market shares in such household products as sheets, pillowcases, towels, and blankets.  
Over the last several years, the company has implemented a restructuring plan consisting of eight elements designed 
to “streamline operations and improve profitability.” (Westpoint, 2002)  The plan includes improvements in invento-
ry management, new market opportunities, savings in logistics and overhead costs.  In addition several plants have 
been closed or scheduled for closing in order to increase the company’s efficiency.  At the time of this writing, 
Westpoint Stevens has not filed Chapter 11. 
 
5.0  Conclusions 
 
 This study examined the use of the Altman’s Z-Score in predicting bankruptcy in the textile industry. It was 
found that the revised Altman’s Z-Score accurately predicts firms that are bankrupt in the first and second years 
prior to the bankruptcy filing. This confirms and extends work previously done by Altman (1993).  
 
 The predictability of the Altman’s Z-Score is not as accurate for Type II errors when compared to previous 
research.  The six firms described above support the growing prediction of a bankrupt company when it has not filed 
for bankruptcy (Altman, 2002).  Creditors and shareholders wanting to avoid bankruptcy costs and hoping to salvage 
as much of their investment as possible, oversold leverage buyouts, and management trying to compensate for poor 
decisions, all are extending the life of some apparently unhealthy firms.  
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6.0  Future Research Applications 
 
 The results show that a bankruptcy tool is useful in identifying unhealthy textile companies. Further research 
is needed to identify additional measures that more accurately predict and reduce the Type II errors. The answer may 
be an industry specific model that adds a new variable such as a ratio for textile exports or currency adjustments. A 
better choice could involve adjusting the discriminant weighting of a current Altman’s Z-Score variable, such as X4. 
Another area for research is the gray zone or, as it was referred to in Altman (1993), the zone of ignorance. As our 
research shows, there are opportunities for inconsistent interpretation of Z-Scores in this range. The narrower this 
zone, the greater the accuracy. Finally, additional research as to the utilization of the Altman’s Z-Score in the reor-
ganization process of bankrupt textile firms may provide information that will be useful in preventing future bank-
ruptcies.  
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